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In recent years, empirical researchers show that firms with higher credit risk have 
much smaller average stock returns. This finding is opposite to the risk-reward 
principle and is often attributed to mispricing and market anomalies. We investigate 
how credit risk and expected stock return are determined in a model with production, 
capital structure and aggregate uncertainty. We show that, contrary to the conventional 


































Most of the analyses on credit risk have focused on default probability or the pricing of 
defaultable securities such as bonds or credit derivatives. The relationship between 
credit risk and stock return is rarely thoroughly investigated.   
In recent years, however, researchers have investigated how the credit risk is reflected 
in the cross-sectional stock return, and most of the papers show results opposite to our 
intuition: firms with higher credit risk have much smaller average stock returns (e.g. 
Dichev(1998), Griffin and Lemmon(2002) and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi(2005)). 
Furthermore, this phenomenon appears even after the market, value and size effect are 
adjusted. 
We investigate how credit risk and expected stock return are determined by economic 
primitives, such as tastes and technology, in the neoclassical framework with rational 
expectations. We show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, a firm with higher 
credit risk can have less risky stock than the one with lower credit risk. 
  In the model we consider a firm with a zero-coupon bond. When the firm faces high 
default risk, the value of the cash flow after the maturity for stockholders is small. 
However, the firm pays dividend before the maturity to the stockholders, which is the 
main determinant of the stock value. Since the value of the cash flow before the 
maturity is more stable than the value of the cash flow after the maturity, the stock has 
low risk and low return, which explains the anomaly of the relationship between credit 
risk and stock return. 
This paper is related to two strands of the financial economics literature. On one hand 
it shares with a series of recent papers such as Berk, Green and Naik (1999), Gomes, 
Kogan and Zhang (2003), Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004), Zhang (2005) and 
Obreja (2006), with the objective of explaining both the predictable variations in equity 
returns through time and the cross-sectional relation between equity returns and 
characteristics. However, these models focus on all-equity firms only except for Obreja 
(2006), while ours focuses on financially leveraged firms.   
 3  Our theoretical model also shares with the credit risk literature on default probability 
and pricing of bonds. Important contribution to this literature include: Merton (1974), 
Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977), Leland (1994), Leland and Toft(1996). From this 
perspective, the novelty in our model stems from the fact that the default probability is 
related to time-varying price of risk. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the empirical research on 
the relationship between credit risk and stock return. In section 3, we present the model, 
outlining the technology, the ownership structure, the objectives, and the decisions of 
the firms. Then we discuss the valuation of the corporate bond and stocks. In section 4, 
we present the results of the paper, and finally we conclude in section 5. The proofs of 
the propositions are in Appendix. 
 
2. Empirical research 
 
Empirical research on the relationship between credit risk and stock return can be 
classified into three groups according to the method of performing the measurement of 
the likelihood of bankruptcy; (1)  using accounting information, such as O score and Z 
score1, (2)  statistical computation using hazard models, and (3)  using structural 
models such as Merton  (1974).  
Dichev (1998) shows that there is a negative correlation between stock return and the 
likelihood of bankruptcy with method of (1), using Z-score. This is confirmed using the 
same method by Griffin and Lemmon (2002), using O-score. Griffin and Lemmon (2002) 
also claim that the phenomenon is caused by that the bad performance of firms with low 
Book-to-Market ratios and high distress risks. They claim that such stocks are often 
mispriced in the market.   
Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2005) analyze the same issues using (2). In that 
paper, a firm with high likelihood of bankruptcy has also a low stock average return and 
they assert that the stock market is mispricing the distress risk.   
Vassalou and Xing (2004) examine the problem with method (3). In that paper, 
contrary to the other research, it is reported that a firm with high likelihood of 
bankruptcy has a high average stock return. And in such firms, those with lower capital 
size and higher book-to-market ratio have even higher average returns.   
Da and Gao (2006) dispute the conclusion of Vassalou and Xing (2004). They propose 
that the short-term return reversal and the liquidity risk can explain most of the results 
in Vassalou and Xing (2004), and conclude that there is little evidence that the 
                                                  
1  See Altman (1968) for Z score and Ohlson (1980) for O score. 
 4likelihood of bankruptcy and the subsequent average stock return have positive 
correlation.  
Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2006) also analyze the relationship between the likelihood of 
bankruptcy and the stock expected return, using EDF (Expected Default Frequency). 
They show that when likelihood of bankruptcy is high, the average stock return does not 
necessarily become high. In the paper, they suggest that when a firm has fallen into 
serious financial crisis there will be a negotiation between a stockholder and a 
bondholder. And they claim that likelihood of bankruptcy and a stock expected return 
are decided depending on bargaining ability using the model of Fan and Sundaresan 
(2000).  
 
3. The model 
 
We construct a neoclassical production model (e.g., Lucas (1967), Lucas and Prescott 
(1971)) augmented with aggregate uncertainty and capital structure. Section 3.A 
describes the economic environment. Section 3.B puts in the capital structure and 







  Firms own technologies that use one input, capital, and exhibit 
decreasing-returns-to-scale. The output in dollar unit, y , is uncertain, depending on the 
realization of both an aggregate shock,x , and an idiosyncratic shock  z . In this model, 
different firms have different idiosyncratic shocks, leading to heterogeneity in the 
production economy. 
 Let    denote the stock of capital at time    and the production function be given by  t k t
                         ,                 ( 3 . A . 1 )   ( ; , ) exp( ) tt t t t t yf k x zk x z
α == t +
1 where  0 α << , which denotes the capital share.   
  We assume that the productivity shocks have stationary and monotone Markov 
transition functions. Specifically,  x  and z  follow stationary autonomous dynamics of 
the following form: 
11 (1 )( )
x
tt x t x xx x x t ρ σε ++ =+− − +                   ( 3 . A . 2 )  
 51 (1 )( )
z
tt z tz t zz z 1 ρ σε + =+− −+ , +   
where 
                  ( 3 . A . 3 )  
 and  1
z
t ε +  
cap
are I.I.D. standard normal shocks. The central tendency of the  1
x
t ε +
aggregate shock is  tured by  x , while the speed of the reversion and the conditional 
volatility are captured by  x ρ  and  x σ , respectively. The parameters  z ρ  and  z σ for 
idiosyncratic process, carry similar interpretations. 
 
A.2. Stochastic Discount Factor 
 
icing kernel without explicitly modeling the consumers’ 
roblem. We assume the process of the pricing kernel 
We parameterize directly the pr
p t M  follows the specifications in 
Z
t
hang (2005), that is 
11 log log ( tt t ) M xx β γ ++ = −−                      ( 3 . A . 3 )    
01 () tt x x γ γγ = +− ,                           ( 3 . A . 4 )  
where  , 0 0 γ >  and  1 0 γ <   are constant parameters. t γ   is time-varying and  β
decreasing  e regate productivi with the d meaned agg ty  t x x − .  t γ   can be interpreted as 
the ma isk, while the constraint on 0 rket price of aggregate r  α <  ensures that this 
price of risk is countercyclical. The central tendency o market price of aggregate 




A.3. Capital Accum la u tion, Adjustment Costs, and Tax 
 
, expressed as a fraction, The law of motion for capital is driven by depreciation δ , of 
the level of capital, and the rate of investment, as a fraction of capital,  . The rat  of 
c
t i e
apital growth is given by the following equation: 
1 () tt t t kk i k δ + = +− .                            ( 3 . A . 5 )  
  We assume that investment is reversible, but to 
 
adjust the level of capital, firms incur 
adjustment costs. Following the literature on inv
a
estment with adjustment costs, we 
ssume that the cost function is given by the quadratic: 
2 (, )
2
tt tt hi k ik
θ
= .                             ( 3 . A . 6 )  
Notice that firms are subject to adjustment cost
when they disinvest. 
s not only when they invest but also 
Further, A firm pays taxes on realized profits,  () tt y k τ δ − . Here, τ  denotes the flat 
tax rate on corporate profits. 
 6 
B. Capital Structure and Default 
 firm is modeled as a single zero-coupon bond of face 
value  maturing at time  . If the after-tax firm value at time   does not exceed 
t
ss
osts are expressed as a fraction,
 
The entire corporate debt of a
F   T T
he actual principal, then default occurs and the shareholders give the ownership to the 
bondholders. Otherwise we a ume that the firm redeems the bond and continues with 
no liability. 
The bankruptcy process is assumed to be instantaneous but costly. We assume that the 
bankruptcy c ξ , of the asset value2. 
eals with the valuation of the outstanding stocks and debt. Upon 
observing the shocks at the beginning of period  , a firm makes optimal investment 
d
the solution of a 
B
 with the valuation of the outstanding stocks.   







ecisions to maximize expected present cash flows for stockholders.   
In our model, since time-homogeneity holds only after the redemption of a zero-coupon 
bond, stock value before the maturity cannot be represented as 
ellman’s equation. In order to solve the problem, first we need to obtain the firm value 
at the maturity by solving a Bellman’s equation, and then solve the dynamic program 




  We start
 t  
lution to the following dynamic program: 
{ } 11 1 1 t t tt t t t t t ++ + + (,,) ( 1 ) ( ) m a x ( ( ,) ) ( ( , , ) )
t
ttt t t t i Wk xz y k k i k hik EM Wk x z τδ δ =− − + + − + + ,
 (3.C.1) 
subject to  t k 1 () tt t kk i δ + =+− .  
In this case, we obtain the following results: 
                                                 
 
 
2  There is no incentive for a firm to decide to default before maturity because we 
assume that the production function is always positive. Therefore, default can occur 
only at maturity. 
 7Proposition1 
There exists a unique value function   that satisfies (3.C.1) and is 
c reasing and differentiable in 
(,,) ttt Wk xz
t k , t x  andzt ontinuous, inc , and concave in  □ 
ee appendix.□ 






At maturity, the v
(,,;)m a x ((,,)( 1 ), 0 ) TTTT TTT VkxzF W kxz F τ =− − ,                    ( 3 . C . 2 )  
Then, we obtain stock value at    tT <  recursively: 
} { max ( ( , )) (
tttt t t t
hi k E M 11 1 1 1
(,,;) ( 1 ) ( )
( , , ; )) ,
t
tt t t t t t t t t i
VkxzF y k k
ik V k x z F
τ δδ




subject to  t k 1 () tt t kk i δ + =+− . 
 
2 




t i 11 1 1 1 ( ( ( , )) ( ( , , ; ))) tt t t t t t t t t ik hi k E M V k x z F ++ + + + − ++
increasing and differentiable in  t k , t
, 
and  (,,; tttt VkxzF at tT <   is continuous,  ) x  and 





 is almost obvious from Proposition 1.□ 
the model is not time-homogeneity because 
of the existence of a zero-coupon bond, 
e a zero-coupon bond. At maturity, the bond price is as follows: 
It
 













Wk x z e l s e TTT





,        ( 3 . C . 4 )  
We obtain the bond value at     recursively:  tT <
11 1 1 1 (,,;) [ ( , , ;) ] tttt t t t t t t B kxzF EM B k x z F ++ + + + = .            ( 3 . C . 5 )  
 
 84. Results 
 
r presents the main results of our model. First, we describe the calibrated 
alues of the parameters used in solving the model. Second, we analyze the relationship 
b
 
rs of the model and their calibrated values are summarized in Table 1. 
This chapte
v






Monthly persistence of aggregate productivity 0.983
Monthly conditional volatility of aggregate productivity 0.00233
Long-run average of the aggregate productivity -3.47
Monthly persistence of idiosyncratic productivity 0.97
Monthly conditional volatility of idiosyncratic productivity 0.1
Capital Dynamics
Capital share 0.3
Monthly depreciation rate 0.01











Table 1: Calibration values for the parameters of the model 
 
The monthly persistence, x ρ , and conditional volatility, x σ , of the aggregate 
productivity shock, are consistent with the quarterly  of Cooley and 
P
 estimates
rescott(1995). The long run average, is calibrated so that the rate of return on a unit of 
invested capital, for an average firm, is, about 30 percent per year, consistent with the 
choice of Berk, Green, and Naik (1999). The monthly persistence, z ρ , and volatility,  z σ , 
 9of the idiosyncratic productivity shock correspond to those in Zhang (2005), and they are 
consistent with the empirical evidence of Pastor and Veronesi (2003). 
The parameters driving the capital flow are calibrated as follows: the capital share  α  
is similar to the choice in Kydland and Prescott (1982), the monthly depreciation rate,δ , 
nt is consistent with the estimates in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2000), and the adjustme  
cost parameter,θ , corresponds to the choice in Zhang (2005) and is consistent with the 
empirical estimates of Whited (1992). 
The parameter  driving the dynamics of pricing kernel, 0 s γ , 1 γ  and β  are similar to 
those in Zhang (2005), and they are calibrated to match the average Sharp ratio, the, 
a s. verage real interest rate and the volatility of interest rate  
The parameters governing the tax system,τ , is consistent with the annual calibrated 
values employed by Moyen (2004). 





 the relationship between expected stock return and default probability3. 
















                 (4.2.1) 
t
where  denotes dividend at time 
      (4.2.2) 
is ex-dividend market value of equity. 
Default probability at  is defined as: 
T





(1 )( ) ( ( , ))
t t
tt t t tt t
dd k x z
yk k i k h i k τδ δ
=
= − −+ −+
.
tt Vd −  
t  
0 (1 ) t V DP E > t =                             ( 4 . 2 . 3 )  
 
A. After the maturity 
 1(a) capture expected stock returns after the maturity   in  “good” 
                                                 
 
The plots of Figure T
 
3  In following study, we set  , 0.5 k = 2 F =  and  20 T = , and following expected return 
and default probability are all conditional. 
 10a
y   in  good 
a
B. Before the maturity 
B.1 Relationship between expected stock return and credit risk 
he plots of Figure 2 capture default probability to idiosyncratic shocks before the 
m
eturns to idiosyncratic shocks before the 
m
nd “bad” economy4. The expected returns are higher in bad economy. This pattern is 
driven by the countercyclical price of risk: In bad economy, since investors become more 
risk averse, the price of risk is higher and the future cash flow is priced lower. However, 
with respect to idiosyncratic shocks, the expected return is almost constant in both good 
and bad economy. This implies that in this model, with no liability, investors price 
aggregate shocks, while investors hardly care about idiosyncratic shocks5. 
The plots of Figure 1(b) capture optimal investment rate after the maturit T
nd bad economy With respect to optimal investment rate, firms with lower 
idiosyncratic or aggregate shocks choose lower investment rate. We can interpret this as 
follows. When the idiosyncratic shock is lower, because of its persistence, the future 
cash flow is also lower, which means that the value of the capital is smaller. What is 
more, when the aggregate shock is lower, since not only the productivity is lower, but 
also the price of risk is higher, the value of the future cash flow, or capital, becomes even 
lower. Then, in such case, since marginal value of investment is also lower, a firm choose 
lower investment rate. If the productivity is extremely low, a firm may even disinvest 





aturity  T   in bad economy at different times. As Figure2 shows, with these 
parameters, the default probability of each firm is very high, especially when the time 
to maturity is short. In the following study, we investigate the relationship between 
expected stock return and default probability. 
The plots of Figure 3 capture expected stock r
aturity  T  in bad economy at different times. Figure 3 shows an interesting result. 
First whe the time to maturity is long ( 0 t n  = ), as idiosyncratic shock is higher, the 
expected stock return becomes lower. How  when the time to maturity is shorter 
( 10,15,18 t = ), as idiosyncratic shock is higher the expected return is not always lower: 
ever,
                                                  
4  In following study, we set    in “good” economy, and  3.467 t x =− 3.493 t x = −  in  “bad” 
economy. Notice that, since a firm loads no debts after the maturity, expected stock 
returns and optimal investment rates of Figure1 does not depend on the time. 
5  Zhang (2005) shows that introducing asymmetric capital adjustment cost, the 
expected returns is significantly high when the idiosyncratic shock is low, which 
generates value premium in cross-section.   
 11R wer idiosyncratic shocks, expected return is increasing. From Figure 2 and 
3, when a firm has very high default probability, the expected stock return of the firm 
can be lower than the one of the firm with lower default probability. 
We analyze this puzzling result as follows. We can decompose the ex-d
ather, in lo
ividend market 
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loating interest,  t SW , and the second term as the value of a call option  t CO   on the 
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In this way, we can interpret that the stock i
and that the expected return and variation of the stock are dependent upon the 
p
e swap is not as small as that of the call option. The 
r
esents the total 
s
ity is




 optimal investment rate to idiosyncratic shocks before 
                            ( 4 . 2 . 1 2 )  
s a portfolio of the swap and the call option, 
roportions of the swap and the call option as contributions to the total stock value. 
To understand the relationship of expected stock returns and default probability, this 
decomposition is useful.   
The point is as follows. When the default probability of a firm is high, the value of the 
call option is small, while that of th
eason is that, even if there is little possibility of survival at the maturity, dividends are 
still paid to the stockholders before the maturity. This cash flow is less risky than the 
cash flow after the maturity. Therefore, when the default probability is high, the 
expected return of the swap is also much lower than that of call option. 
This explains the puzzling result of Figure 3. When the default probability is low, as 
the plots  0 t =  in Figure3, we can interpret that the portfolio that repr
tock value has high weight on the call option. If idiosyncratic shock is higher, the 
weight on the call option of the portfolio becomes higher and, at the same time, the risk 
of the call option becomes lower. As a result, the risk of portfolio becomes lower and the 
expected return of it becomes lower. This is the reason why the plot of  0 t =   in Figure 3 
is decreasing. 
On the other hand, take a look at the case when the default probabil  high as the 
plots  10,15 t = ,18 
es up as mu
folio beco
igh weight on the swap. If idiosyncratic shock is higher, since the value of swap does 
not go ch as that of call option, the weight on the call option becomes higher. 
As idiosyncratic shock is higher, the call option becomes less risky. Still, when the 
default probability is very high, the risk of call option is much higher than that of swap. 
Therefore, by raising the weight on the riskier call option, the portfolio becomes riskier 
and its expected return becomes higher as idiosyncratic shock is higher. This is why the 
plots of  15,18 t =   in Figure3 are increasing. In case idiosyncratic shock is much higher, 
since the expected return of call option is not much higher compared to that of the swap, 
the port mes less risky and its expected return becomes lower. This is the 
reason that the plot of  10 t =   starts to decrease if the idiosyncratic shock is high. 
 
B.2 Optimal investmen e 
The plots of Figure 4 capture
 13the maturity  in bad economy at different times. This figure implies that the higher 
d
 time? If a firm has no debts, expected stock return 
w
t the cross-sectional expected stock return is lower when the 
cross-sectional credit risk is higher is consistent with the empirical research of 
D
d
rofit. One of the solutions is the introduction of nonnegative fixed cost 
T  
efault probability is, the lower the optimal investment rate is. By investment, a firm 
exchanges today’s cash for future cash flow. If it expects good future cash flow by 
investment, a firm invests a lot. However, if it doesn’t, a firm invests little, or even 
disinvests and increases dividend if allowed by the bond covenants. In case a firm has 
liability and default probability is high, with low expected cash flow after the maturity, 
a firm will make little investment. 
How does investment change the expected stock return, compared with the case in 
which a firm does not invest at any
ill be low because by investment stockholders can increase the stock value and 
decrease its risk. Then consider a firm with liability. In such case, investment will also 
increase stock value. However, if the firm has high default probability, since the weight 
of call option will increase, the portfolio will be riskier. Therefore, in a high default 
probability, investment can increase the value of call option more than, the one of swap, 
and make the expected stock return higher. 
 
4.3  Discussion 
 
The result tha
ichev(1998), Griffin and Lemmon(2002) and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2005). 
However, some of the results from the model need further discussion. First, the results 
implies that if default probability is higher, since the weight of swap value is higher, 
ividend yield,  / tt dV , becomes higher. Though this seems at odds, there is no empirical 
research on the relationship between credit risk and dividend yield, further research is 
needed. 
Second, in the model, even if a firm defaults at the maturity, the firm still has always 
positive p f  to 
profit function (3.A.1), 
exp( ) .
α
tt t t yk xz f = +−                        ( . 1 )   4 . 3
With this introduction, there will be the possibility of default with negative profit and 
therefore there is possibility of default before the maturit
f
y of the debt because of the 
ixed cost. Due to the potential negative profit, there will be the case of a negative stock 
value before the maturity if a firm continues. Even if we introduce the fixed cost, since 
the weight of swap value is larger than that of call option in higher default probability, 
 14the lower expected stock return still holds. In this paper for simplicity, the profit 
function has no fixed cost. 
Finally, the relationship between the investment and credit risk has not been 
confirmed in empirical research. It can provide fresh directions for future research. 
 
 
e propose a neoclassical production augmented with capital structure 
and aggregate uncertainty. In our model, we show that, although the credit risk is high, 
u
position 1 
 is a special case of Zhang (2005). We prove the former half of the proposition, the 
tion of the asset value only. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, w
nder investors’ expectation for stable dividend payments before the maturity, expected 
stock return can be lower than when credit risk is low. The puzzling phenomenon, 
interpreted by Griffin and Lemmon (2002) and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2005) 
as mispricing, is therefore consistent with rational expectations. Still, to be persuasive, 






uniqueness of the func
Let  T  be the functional operator associated with the dynamic program in (3.5.1).   
That is: 
{ } 11 1 1
t
ttt t t t tt t t t t t i ++ + + () (,,) m a x ( ( ,) ) ( ( , , ) ) TW k x z y ik hi k E M Wk x z =+ − + +          ( A . 1 )  
To see whether the operator  has a unique solution, it is sufficien




t to check the 
ollows immediately from the l earity of the T  and V . The discounting condition 




11 1 1 1
(




tt t t t t t t t t t i i k h ik EMWk x z EM a
+
++ + + + − + + +
1 1 1 () ( , , ) m a x ( ( , ) ) ( ( , , ) )
max
ttt t t t tt t t t t t TW a k x z y ik hi k E M Wk x z a
y
+ + + += + − + + +
=+ t
 (A.2) 
for any real  . Therefore, as long as  1 0 a > 1 () tt EM + < , the discounting prope
satisfied and  is a contraction mappi s that the operator   has a 
u int in nd bounded
rty is 
 T   ng. This ensure T
nique fixed po  the space of continuous a  function.□ 
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Figure1 (b): Optimal investment rate to idiosyncratic shocks after the maturity 
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Figure 2: Conditional default probability to idiosyncratic shocks in bad economy   
 




Figure 4: Optimal investment rate to idiosyncratic shocks in bad economy 
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